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In the context of a transatlantic comparison, the first thing to 
be mentioned is the difference between the time sequence of 
financial reforms in the European Union and its equivalent in 
the United States. The financial crisis started simultaneously 
on both sides of the Atlantic, with the initial disruption of 
some financial market segments in August 2007 and the major 
panic episode of September through October 2008. But they 
are not at the same stage of policy reaction and especially regu-
latory reform now. At least four reasons can be identified for 
this difference. 
The first major reason is the fact that beyond the first 
weeks following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial 
crisis  management  has  been,  on  the  whole,  much  simpler, 
swifter, and more effective in the United States than in the 
European Union so far. Specifically, the “stress tests” conducted 
by the US authorities in the late winter and early spring of 
2009, though certainly far from flawless, triggered a signifi-
cant recapitalization of those institutions at the core of the 
financial system, which in turn allowed some trust to return 
to the US interbank market in spite of numerous subsequent 
failures of smaller banks. In the European Union, the rebound 
in bank share prices that accompanied the US stress tests also 
allowed a number of banks to recapitalize under acceptable 
conditions,  but  these  tended  to  be  the  relatively  stronger 
ones, not those that most needed an overhaul of their balance 
sheets. A first wave of EU-wide stress tests was completed in 
September 2009 and had little, if any, measurable impact as 
its results were not disclosed to the public and not open to 
external scrutiny. In a second wave of stress tests, completed 
in July 2010, results were published but their quality, and 
correspondingly the consistency of the stress-testing process 
from one country to another, was later found to be severely 
wanting. As a consequence, EU stress tests so far have not 
performed the function of triage that would have effectively 
triggered the recapitalization and restructuring that are argu-
ably indispensible to put the European banking system back 
on a sustainable track. A third wave of EU-wide stress tests is 
envisaged in early 2011. 
Needless to mention, in 2010 the sovereign credit crisis 
that started in Greece and spread in the euro area came in addi-
tion to the unresolved banking crisis, and these two crises—
sovereign and banking—have fed each other ever since. The 
fragility of the banking system was accentuated by the Greek 
crisis,  but  it  also  prevented  the  Greek  debt  restructuring 
that could arguably have brought it to a prompt resolution. 
Conversely, the aggravation of the banking crisis in Ireland 
after the summer of 2010 played a key role in precipitating 
the Irish sovereign crisis in November, and similar concerns 
weigh very negatively on Spain. In comparison, the US “fore-
closuregate” has not resulted, at the time of writing, in major 
disruption in the US financial system; and while there is vivid 
debate on the long-term sustainability of US public finances, 
this has not resulted in short-term financing concerns for the 
US government. The bottom line is that the United States was 
able to start its discussion of financial regulatory reform in 
June 2009—with the publication of a blueprint document by 
the executive branch—in an environment that was essentially 
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in the midst of a financial crisis even though it has started a 
number of long-term efforts of financial reform.
A second factor associated with the difference in timing 
is the difference in legislative processes between the United 
States  and  European  Union.  In  Washington,  all  issues  of 
financial  reform  (except  housing  finance,  which  was  kept 
separate to the vocal protest of many in the then-Republican 
congressional  minority)  were  discussed  at  federal  level  in 
the context of one single package of legislation, eventually 
named after Senator Christopher Dodd and Representative 
Barney Frank. Even though the process was delayed by several 
months because of unforeseen developments in the discus-
sion of the healthcare reform bill, it was eventually completed 
in July 2010, little more than a year after the publication of 
the Obama administration’s initial blueprint. By contrast, in 
Europe the relevant reform issues were sliced and diced into a 
significant number of separate legislative texts. A few of these 
were finalized as early as 2009 (on harmonization of deposit 
insurance regimes, registration of credit rating agencies, and 
a first revision of the Capital Requirements Directive known 
as CRD 2), but most are either under discussion or not even 
yet drafted at the time of writing, including legislation on 
the organization of markets for derivatives and securities, and 
on bank crisis management and resolution. Moreover these 
multiple,  separate  texts  at  EU  level  are  complemented  by 
significant—and not always coordinated—legislative activity 
at individual member state level on issues that would typically 
be discussed at federal rather than state level in a US context 
(such as insolvency procedures for financial institutions and 
taxation of the financial sector). 
A third contributing factor is the fact that in Europe the 
reform of financial supervisory architecture was given priority 
over most other agenda items, while in the United States it was 
granted much less prominence that initially envisaged. This 
was the case in the reform proposals floated by then-Treasury 
Secretary Hank Paulson in the spring of 2008. In this area, the 
starting points were markedly different on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In the United States, a system of specialized federal 
financial supervisory and regulatory agencies has been in place 
since at least the 1930s, including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the prudential super-
visory duties of the Federal Reserve System. In the European 
Union, while the European Commission plays a key role in 
the legislative process, financial regulation and supervision had 
remained the remit of national authorities, which regularly met 
in EU-level committees (with a small central secretariat but 
no ability to impose a decision on their members) only since 
the early 2000s. This situation was perhaps workable in the 
broadly deregulatory era that preceded the crisis, but became 
increasingly seen as untenable when the crisis made Europe, as 
the United States, embark on a drive toward reregulation of its 
financial system. If carried out in an uncoordinated manner at 
a national level, this reregulation would quickly have collided 
with the commitment to a single financial market enshrined 
in the EU treaty. Thus, in February 2009 the report of a high-
level group chaired by Jacques de Larosière recommended the 
creation of EU-level public financial oversight bodies, and the 
corresponding legislation was given priority in the legislative 
process and eventually adopted in the early autumn of 2010. 
Thus, on January 1, 2011, the European Union will have a 
European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), and a European Insurance 
and  Occupational  Pensions  Authorities  (EIOPA),  comple-
mented  by  a  European  Systemic  Risk  Board,  and  the  first 
three (also known collectively as the European Supervisory 
Authorities) will be established each as an autonomous agency 
of the European Union. Even though they start with limited 
powers and resources, these new actors can be expected to play 
a major role in future EU financial regulatory developments. 
A fourth factor may have been related to the timing of 
renewal  of  the  European  Commission,  which  was  delayed 
in 2009–10 by considerations related to the adoption and 
implementation  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  a  matter  essentially 
unrelated  to  the  financial  and  economic  crisis.  While  the 
Obama  administration  took  office  in  January  2009,  the 
European Commission retained lame-duck status throughout 
2009. It was only in early 2010 that Michel Barnier replaced 
Charlie McCreevy as Commissioner for the Internal Market 
and Services with a portfolio that includes financial regula-
tion.  Moreover,  Commissioner  McCreevy  had  started  his 
term as commissioner in 2004 assertively promoting a strong 
deregulatory agenda and was therefore largely seen as inca-
pacitated when the events of late 2008 imposed a different 
policy orientation. This year, he has taken additional blame for 
his responsibility in the Irish property bubble of the 2000s, as 
Irish finance minister from 1997 to 2004. 
As a consequence, EU stress tests so far 
have not performed the function of triage 
that would have effectively triggered the 
recapitalization and restructuring that are 
arguably indispensible to put the European 
banking system back on a sustainable track.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 3 0   de c e m b e r   2 0 1 0
3
RefoRm AReAs 
In terms of banking reform, the European Union initially 
focused  on  two  limited  if  significant  adjustments.  First,  it 
harmonized  key  provisions  of  national  deposit  guarantee 
schemes, as the unfolding of the financial crisis in October 
2008 illustrated the danger of disruptive arbitrage behavior 
that could be fostered by differences between national deposit 
insurance regimes. Second, it mandated that the originators 
of securitization products should retain a minimum 5 percent 
economic interest so as to keep them incentivized to continu-
ously monitor the corresponding credit risks. This latter legis-
lation (CRD 2) was adopted in 2009 and is a relatively rare 
occurrence of financial regulatory reform that was adopted 
first in the European Union and then in the United States in a 
near-identical form as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
In 2010, the European Union adopted additional legisla-
tion (known as CRD 3) that aims at constraining the remu-
neration patterns that banks may adopt for their traders and 
executives. The limitations are on the structure of remunera-
tion packages rather than on the corresponding amounts paid. 
So far this does not have an equivalent in the United States, 
predictably leading to complaints by the EU financial industry 
that it is put at a competitive disadvantage. 
The initial Capital Requirements Directive was adopted 
in 2006 and was largely based on the Basel II capital accord, 
unlike in the United States where capital requirements have 
so far remained primarily set on a national basis. The final-
ization  in  September  2010  of  the  Basel  III  capital  accord, 
and its endorsement in November by G-20 leaders at their 
Seoul summit, open the way for new EU capital requirements 
legislation, not yet drafted but already known as CRD 4. It 
remains to be seen how fully Basel III will be endorsed by 
CRD  4—especially  the  leverage  ratio,  which  did  not  exist 
in Basel II and has met much opposition from prominent 
European financial firms. 
As  in  the  United  States,  resolution  authorities  and 
processes  are  an  important  part  of  the  crisis  management 
framework. However, in the European Union corporate and 
bankruptcy  laws  are  set  at  national  level,  and  there  is  no 
EU-level banking charter, which makes harmonization more 
difficult in this area. In spite of the failure of coordination 
in the case of Fortis Bank in early October 2008 (resulting 
in unilateral nationalization of that bank’s Dutch operations 
by  the  Netherlands’  government  while  most  operations  in 
Belgium and Luxembourg were taken over by BNP Paribas), 
no credible policy framework has yet been introduced in the 
European Union for addressing cross-border banking crises—
even though the level of cross-border integration is so high 
that most of the banking sector in many EU countries is in 
foreign  (but  almost  exclusively  EU)  hands.  The  European 
Commission’s suggestions on the design of national resolu-
tion funds, published in May 2010, have so far been met with 
skepticism  or  indifference  by  several  member  states.  Draft 
legislation on crisis resolution and management is expected in 
early 2011 and may prove one of the more controversial items 
of the current EU legislative agenda. 
On the whole, Europeans have been generally reluctant 
so far to envisage additional requirements for what the current 
financial jargon designates as systemically important finan-
cial institutions (SIFIs). Likewise, the debate on whether to 
mandate  the  separation  of  certain  functions  from  banking 
groups—which in the United States resulted in the adoption 
of the “Volcker Rule” under which banks were supposed to 
divest or close proprietary trading activities—has not been 
actively addressed yet in most countries or at EU level. 
Another big set of possible reforms affects market struc-
tures, including the proposed European Market Infrastructure 
Legislation (EMIL) and a revision of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID). The initial proposals suggest 
the European Commission’s willingness to limit as much as 
possible the differences between the European policy frame-
work and that adopted in the United States as part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, in part out of concern about the poten-
tial  harmful  effect  of  regulatory  arbitrage.  On  the  face  of 
it, it would thus seem that this is an area where the United 
States effectively set a transatlantic standard by moving first. 
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  eventual  legislation 
could end up being somewhat different from the European 
Commission’s initial proposals. 
The regulation of private equity and hedge funds, by 
the Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Directive, 
has given rise to considerable expense of political energy. This 
project originated before the crisis and the legislation was only 
adopted in the autumn of 2010 after lengthy debates in the 
European  Parliament.  The  final  version  is  significantly  less 
radical than initially envisaged and will result in the registra-
On the whole, Europeans have 
been generally reluctant so far to 
envisage additional requirements 
for what the current financial jargon 
designates as systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs).N u m b e r   Pb10 - 3 0   d e c e m b e r   2 0 1 0
4
tion of most such funds with securities authorities as well as 
obligations of public disclosure. Somewhat similar provisions 
are currently envisaged in the United States as part of the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Rating  Agencies  were  not  regulated  in  the  European 
Union until the crisis; legislation in 2009 submitted them to 
registration  requirements.  However,  Commissioner  Barnier 
made it clear that he considered this insufficient and that a 
more restrictive approach was needed. The corresponding new 
legislation is currently in a public consultation phase and will 
be further debated in 2011. One key aspect of this discussion 
is whether the eventual legislation will allow rating agencies to 
keep a globally uniform methodology, even as they are directly 
regulated in an increasing number of separate jurisdictions. 
In accounting, the European Commission has repeatedly 
exerted  pressure  on  the  International  Accounting  Standards 
Board (IASB) and the Trustees of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation in which the IASB 
is hosted. In October 2008 the IASB, in a politically charged 
atmosphere, had to adopt an amendment allowing banks to 
reclassify assets across accounting categories, and in October 
2010 for the appointment of a new IASB chair. However, this 
has not so far resulted in the consideration of new legislation in 
this area. The commission has also recently launched a public 
consultation on reform of the auditing sector, but it is yet 
unclear what legislative proposals may result from this process. 
ChAllenges AheAd
Several challenges loom beyond the complexity of this EU 
legislative program, most of which remains to be completed. 
Only three are mentioned here, with no pretense of being 
exhaustive. 
One immediate challenge is the establishment of the three 
new  European  Supervisory  Authorities  (EBA,  ESMA,  and 
EIOPA), which are scheduled to start on January 1, 2011, but 
whose senior management (chairs and chief executives) have 
not yet been appointed at the time of writing. The initial steps 
of these new bodies will be crucial in establishing their initial 
credibility and enabling the future development of their respon-
sibilities. A particular concern is their governance framework, 
which centers on supervisory boards formed of member state 
representatives and in which the adequate consideration of the 
EU  interest,  as  opposed  to  diplomatic  arrangements  among 
individual countries, cannot be taken for granted. 
A  perhaps  less  pressing,  but  no  less  important,  chal-
lenge is the definition of a credible policy framework for the 
management and resolution of cross-border banking crises, a 
discussion that is unlikely to be put to an end by the legisla-
tive proposals expected from the European Commission in 
the first half of 2011. In the global context the absence of 
such a framework, in spite of the discussions fostered by the 
Financial Stability Board on international SIFIs, is likely to 
result in more independently capitalized and funded national 
subsidiaries, whose assets can be ring fenced in a relatively 
straightforward way in the event of a crisis. However, such 
a model, which has largely been adopted (at least for retail 
banking activities) by leading international banking groups 
such  as  Citi,  HSBC,  or  Santander,  sits  uneasily  with  the 
commitment to a single market for financial services within 
the European Union. In April 2010, the IMF proposed the 
introduction of an EU-level bank resolution authority, but 
this proposal has not yet attracted a critical mass of support in 
the EU policy community. 
At a broader level the European Union faces the chal-
lenge of strengthening its capacity to produce high-quality 
rules  for  an  increasingly  complex  financial  system.  This  is 
partly a question of adequate resources, but not only. In the 
two decades before the financial crisis, the European Union 
was able to rely on a momentum toward global convergence 
that was largely driven by the private sector in an environment 
of deregulation and provided a powerful external engine for 
intra-EU harmonization. But the context has been radically 
transformed through the crisis. The shift toward reregulation 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the increasing multipolarity of 
global finance, and the rise of emerging economies as major 
centers  of  financial  activity  make  the  prospect  of  global 
convergence of financial rules more elusive. In this new envi-
ronment, the European Union will have to devote more effort 
to  define  its  own  model  of  financial  regulation,  which  on 
many aspects cannot refer to a global standard that does not 
exist. The creation of the European Supervisory Authorities, if 
successful, can contribute to the emergence of a distinctively 
European regulatory philosophy that would be more than just 
a compromise among member states’ positions. But this can 
probably only be a gradual and relatively slow process. 
In April 2010, the IMF proposed the 
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